Rochel Junior
Suwayda - The massacre in the southern Syrian city of As-Suwayda, carried out by jihadists from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under the cover of the Syrian Interim Government, did not happen overnight. It was the culmination of years of sectarian incitement and hate speech that had been festering since the fall of the regime, until it erupted into unspeakable atrocities that spared neither child nor elder.

During the July assault on As-Suwayda, 1,709 people — most of them Druze — were killed. According to UN experts, women and even minors were subjected to sexual violence, and at least 105 Druze women were abducted by HTS militants. Many remain missing to this day.

“Hate Speech… The Beginning of the Collapse”

Attorney Rudaina al-Khatib, a native of As-Suwayda, recalls the massacre months later as a moment that “shattered the very idea of national unity.”
“It was a huge shock no one expected,” she says. “What happened was not spontaneous — it was the inevitable result of years of hate rhetoric and sectarian provocation. We saw the signs, but no one wanted to believe where it would lead.”

Al-Khatib explains that “hate speech” lacks a unified legal definition in international law, but the United Nations describes it as “any kind of communication, in speech, writing, or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are.”

She emphasizes that history has repeatedly shown how sectarian rhetoric ends — in violence. “Syria is a painful example. Years of sectarian polarization have torn the country apart and fueled systematic waves of violence.”

“From the Dream of Revolution to the Reality of Division”

Al-Khatib reflects on the early days of the Syrian revolution, when people dreamed of ending dictatorship and building a nation based on law and citizenship.
“The Syrian people had immense hope,” she recalls. “They wanted to end a corrupt regime and start anew. But that dream was never realized.”

The disappointment, she explains, came when groups that took power acted with the mentality of militias, not states. “Transitional justice never materialized, accountability disappeared, and the public sphere filled with hatred and revenge. What began as political polarization soon devolved into sectarian division — between those labeled as Assad loyalists, supposedly representing minorities, and those seen as Sunni opposition. This false dichotomy fractured the social fabric.”

“As-Suwayda Between Accusation and Marginalization”

As-Suwayda, often branded as “pro-regime,” became trapped in a narrative of blame. “People said the Druze didn’t join the revolution because they were loyal to Assad,” says Al-Khatib. “This accusation fostered resentment and alienation.”

The sense of exclusion deepened after the constitutional declaration that followed, which failed to include meaningful Druze representation in the interim government. “People here felt marginalized within their own homeland,” she explains. “Meanwhile, others believed we had excluded them — a cycle of mutual blame that only widened the divide.”

“The Fabricated Recording… The Spark That Lit the Fuse”

Tensions exploded when a fabricated audio recording surfaced, allegedly featuring a Druze sheikh insulting the Prophet Muhammad. “Its authenticity was never proven,” Al-Khatib clarifies, “but its impact was devastating. Anger swept through universities in Homs and Aleppo, leading to physical clashes among students.”

The Interim Government’s handling of the crisis, she says, was “a disaster.”
“They should have intervened immediately to calm the situation, but they did nothing. Hate speech flooded social media, students began fearing each other, and parents stopped sending their children to universities.”

This moment, she stresses, marked a dangerous turning point — “the youth, once seen as the country’s hope for unity and progress, lost faith in institutions altogether.”

“From Incitement to Massacre”

Events escalated rapidly. “The anger turned into attacks on civilian neighborhoods like Ashrafiyat Sahnaya and Jaramana,” Al-Khatib recounts. “That was the warning sign — Syria was heading for an explosion.”

When forces from the so-called Ministry of Defense and General Security entered As-Suwayda, she says, “they didn’t come as a national authority — they came as a force of vengeance. Thirty-three villages were completely emptied, their residents fleeing for their lives.”

According to Al-Khatib, the atrocities were deliberate and systematically documented — not by victims, but by the perpetrators themselves. “The videos that circulated were filmed by the HTS fighters and the government’s own forces,” she reveals. “Ordinary people couldn’t document anything — they were too terrified to even leave their homes.”

“Justifying the Crime… The Collapse of Trust”

Perhaps even more shocking than the massacre, Al-Khatib says, was how the Interim Government tried to justify it.
“Government spokespersons claimed the attackers were tribal militias — not official forces,” she recounts bitterly. “But everyone saw those militias enter the city under government supervision. Then the government had the audacity to thank them for their ‘help.’ That was the final insult.”

She concludes with a question that echoes the despair of many Syrians: “How can anyone talk about a ‘national fabric’ when the very authorities meant to protect it are the ones justifying sectarian killings?”.