Iran… Twenty Days of Internet Shutdown and a Limited Return
After over twenty days of silence and communication disruptions, limited internet access has returned, uncertain and troubling, with no clarity on when connectivity will resume.
SAYEH MOHBI
Urmia — At the height of widespread strikes and protests in Iran, and following a complete internet shutdown, silence engulfed the country. Today, after more than twenty days of total blackout accompanied by severe disruptions, connectivity has partially and intermittently returned—a situation that does not reflect a return to normalcy so much as a suspended state.
According to data and reports issued by international organizations such as NetBlocks and Cloudflare, what users now have access to is nothing more than a network surrounded by strict restrictions, with multiple layers of filtering and fluctuating disruptions that may change daily or even hourly.
This report reviews the events related to internet and communications from the first day of the shutdown until the present moment, amid a future that remains unclear and undefined.
The Beginning of “White Torture”
With the complete internet shutdown at 10:00 p.m. on Thursday, January 8, landline and mobile phone services were disrupted for five days. Until January 17, sending text messages was not possible. People inside and outside Iran described the blackout and disruptions as akin to being trapped in a “deep, dark well,” while critics considered it an example of “collective white torture,” given its widespread psychological impact on society.
Sania K., a resident of Mahabad in eastern Kurdistan, described the first days of the shutdown:
“It felt like we were stuck in a dark well. Phones would stop working as darkness fell around six or seven in the evening, and we had no news of our relatives in other cities for two days. We followed events only through satellite TV channels, without our voices reaching anywhere.”
According to local media, the internet was completely cut off until January 10, after which local applications continued to experience persistent disruptions.
Confiscation of Satellite Dishes and Disruption of “Starlink”
Starting on January 10, unauthorized home entries began in Tehran to confiscate satellite dishes and Starlink devices, later expanding to other cities.
Awan H., a resident of Sanandaj, said:
“They knocked on our neighbors’ door and aggressively went up to the rooftop, taking all the satellite dishes. Residents of standalone houses shut their doors, drew the curtains, and turned off the lights out of fear that they might knock or assume the house was empty.”
Some residents, especially in apartment complexes, moved satellite dishes from rooftops to balconies to reduce the risk of detection. In cities such as Sardasht, security forces reportedly used cranes to access rooftops and balconies. In Mahabad, Baneh, Saqqez, and other cities, there were reports of forced entry and broken glass doors to reach rooftops.
One media outlet affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard claimed that Iran, with China’s assistance, managed to disrupt Starlink services. A reliable source confirmed the disruption during the early days:
“Some people restarted their devices with the help of satellite channels, but they only use them when absolutely necessary and with extreme caution to avoid detection.”
“We Are Alive”
On January 14, authorities allowed one-way outbound calls to foreign countries—calls that mostly lasted only two to four minutes and were extremely expensive. Nasrin M. said:
“Throughout the call, I could hear noise, and all I managed to tell my brother was: We are alive.”
After nearly twenty days of banning incoming calls from abroad to Iran, calls to landlines only became possible again as of January 26, under strict monitoring.
A Borderline Connection to the World
The absence of news about loved ones and fears of greater losses to businesses and plans pushed some people toward border areas. Initially, roaming on local SIM cards drew crowds to the borders, but once that was disabled, the market for foreign SIM cards and short cross-border trips flourished.
Kajal K. from Marivan said:
“Bashmaq border crossing was extremely crowded for travel and purchasing smuggled SIM cards. An Iraqi SIM card with 2 GB of internet was selling for up to 20 million tomans. eSIM services worked well near the border. My friend used to go every two days to Baneh or Sardasht to contact her brother abroad. Soon, however, the borders filled with security forces searching for SIM card and VPN sellers.”
Parisa Sh., who was waiting for an important email from a foreign university, had to cross the border herself:
“The driver charged 4 million tomans from Urmia to the Razi border. After paying exit and entry fees to Turkey, I opened my email at the Van city terminal and returned to Iran an hour later.”
VPNs: From a Connectivity Tool to a Surveillance Instrument
Internet access in Iran has become entirely dependent on VPNs. Some IP addresses from data centers and providers entered the market, selling for up to 15 million tomans or more, yet they were unstable.
The market remains active, but sellers do not guarantee continuous connectivity. People also do not trust the security of their connections through these tools and are constantly searching for better alternatives.
The authorities promote free configurations and insecure local applications such as Baleh, iGap, and Eitaa in an attempt to access users’ activity details. Inside the country, users cannot receive login verification codes for global applications such as Telegram and WhatsApp.
False Promises and a Restricted Internet
Over two weeks, no more than 2% of the population gained internet access. The restoration of global internet connectivity was postponed from the middle of the second week to its end, and misinformation began during the third week. An abnormal increase in traffic indicated the expansion of a “whitelist” of domains—meaning the authorities opened access only to selected and approved websites, while the free internet remained blocked.
Kazhiwa S. described the difficulty of connecting during the third week:
“For every few minutes of connection, we had to try a different VPN and a different operator. Voice or video calls and sending or receiving files were impossible.”
At the beginning of the fourth week of disruption, people still lack stable access to the global internet. Experts confirm that internet services will not return to normal anytime soon, and that Iranian authorities are working to build or fine-tune a new system to block and control traffic whenever needed.