Rochelle Junior

As-Suwayda — Violence against women in Syria is one of the main causes of the country’s crisis and among the most deeply rooted forms of social and political domination. Syria has experienced two major transfers of power in recent years: the first under jihadist rule following the fall of the Baath regime.

In Damascus, the policies of both regimes align closely with regard to women. In this sense, both administrations share similar ideological approaches regarding the role and position of women; this shared understanding shapes the current system with patterns inherited from the past.

However, these patterns have varied in political practice under the cloak of jihadism and Sharia. Policies of misogyny, widespread throughout the country, have produced an extremely brutal reality. Violence against women is not limited to isolated acts or random incidents; rather, it represents a structural phenomenon intertwined with politics, society, the economy, and culture.

Since the outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, violence has spread across the country. Violence that proliferated with the war became a tool of coercion used by the state against society, especially women. In the later years of the war, the proliferation of armed groups organized by foreign powers plunged the Syrian people and women in particular into the vortex of conflict. Women became central targets for political, social, cultural, and economic control.

Violence against women in Syria manifests in many aspects of daily life, including physical and psychological abuse, kidnapping, rape, torture, and economic, social, and political violence. It also appears in legal and cultural forms aimed at restricting personal freedom, imposing obedience, and enforcing subordination. This violence is not limited to individual assaults; it is part of an institutional, social, and cultural hierarchy, perpetuated by the intertwining of political authority with traditional masculinity and societal constraints.

 

The Structural Foundations of Violence in Syria

Violence in Syria is shaped by centralization, the equation of a patriarchal state, and legal and social discrimination—factors that deepen the ongoing crisis. The Syrian state, built as a nation-state, was founded on religious fundamentalism, gender discrimination, and nationalism, carrying accumulated problems over the past century into the present.

This complex set of problems erupted into a worsening crisis after 2011, leading to the fragmentation of the state. The inability of the nation-state to produce solutions placed it in a position where it gambled with the country’s future. With the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria entered a new era. However, this era was not very different from its predecessor. The temporary jihadist administration of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham inherited the centralized state structure and developed a worldview that does not recognize peoples, communities, beliefs, or especially women beyond its framework.

The role assigned to women in the religious legal system based on Sharia and jihadism witnessed in Idlib in recent years manifested in placing women under the black veil and depriving them of all their rights—policies that continue even in Damascus today.

At present, Syria has become a state of militias, where mercenaries, jihadist groups, and security forces use violence not only to impose obedience but also as a basis for reproducing power and domination. We are speaking of a quasi-nonexistent state structure. In the current regional reality, it is nearly impossible to speak of an effective state, its laws, government, or especially women’s rights in Syria.

These jihadist groups, which impose political Islamic Sharia on society, have fueled Syria’s inferno. Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish regions continue to suffer from systematic massacres, looting, rape, kidnapping of women, arbitrary arrests, crimes committed under the pretext of “honor,” and the ongoing denial of women’s economic and social rights. This scenario is one of the fundamental pillars of the current Syrian crisis.

Religious extremism imposes restrictions on lifestyle, clothing, behavior, education, and work—using religion to justify violence. This deepens collective fear and intimidation against these practices. The rape culture and repression imposed on the region aim to suppress women’s struggles through terror. Except for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria, military structures across the country have proven their ability to make every area they enter unlivable.

This mentality, which diminishes the role of women in society, exploits rape culture as one of the most common forms of aggression. Male dominance appears in monopolizing decision-making mechanisms and reducing women’s roles to obedience and care. Violence is one of the main tools for reproducing this domination.

During conflicts and disasters, women often face harsher repression and violence due to power imbalances and increasing economic and social tensions. This reveals the continued presence of a male-dominated structure that constantly reproduces violence at both individual and institutional levels.

 

HTS Jihadists and Women

The events of December 8, 2024, were nothing more than a military coup by one faction of the Syrian conflict against another, resulting in an undemocratic and non-peaceful transfer of authority. This posed a significant challenge to civil and feminist movements, especially with the rise of the term “revolutionary legitimacy,” which opened the door to excluding anyone outside the victorious faction using the phrase “whoever liberates, rules.” This situation posed a serious threat, particularly to civil society and women’s movements.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is a jihadist group that opposes women’s rights. This was evident in the massacres committed by organizations such as al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, and ISIS, from which HTS emerged, as well as in the experience of Idlib since 2017 under what was called the “Salvation Government,” which targeted women and restricted their freedom under the name of “Sharia” and “religion.” The feminist movement was criminalized, and even the simplest women’s demands were rejected. The group’s position rejecting the use of the term “democracy” and all international conventions related to it—especially CEDAW—is clear in its ongoing policy, including enforcing hijab, promoting niqab, and gender segregation in Idlib’s universities.

These policies are now spreading to Damascus, Homs, Hama, and even the Syrian coast. Women’s representation in political positions has been limited to a single symbolic ministry, reflecting the continued traditional approach of minimizing women’s roles in public and political life. This solitary appointment serves only to silence public criticism.

Statements by officials such as Ubaiyda Arnout and Aisha al-Dibs, head of what was known as the Women’s Affairs Office, affirmed a limited role for women under religious and political authority. No one expected different behavior from these women chosen by HTS. Whether these policies are carried out by men or women makes no difference—the goal remains to keep Syrian women under the grip of jihad and Sharia, erasing their existence and deepening their subordination.

 

The Damascus–Idlib Connection

After HTS took control of Idlib and western Aleppo countryside, women suffered from a significant increase in violations, including kidnapping, rape, arbitrary detention, mandatory niqab, restrictions on movement, and limitations on access to education and employment. Additionally, the group implemented practices reminiscent of the Middle Ages, turning women into commodities in markets it established in Idlib.

HTS’s activities and those of its affiliates in Idlib over the years have revealed widespread forms of violence and discrimination against women. While some documented reports detail forced conservative dress and movement restrictions—including requiring male guardians for travel—others point to arrests of women journalists and women’s rights defenders.

After HTS seized power, these practices became more visible to the public. A Reuters report published in June 2025 confirmed that at least 33 Alawite women were kidnapped during the attack, some taken to Idlib and others transferred outside Syria.

Field evidence suggests that the number of abducted Alawite women was far higher, and thousands of Druze and Yazidi women were previously targeted in similar ways. These women were subjected to what jihadists call “sabiy”—in reality, extreme violations such as sexual enslavement and being sold in markets.

Millions of Syrian women suffer economically and socially from limited access to employment, girls’ education, and pressures of displacement and unemployment. Many women are forced to work in unsafe conditions or engage in unregulated and unprotected labor. A 2024 report by the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) confirmed that the crisis in Northwest Syria has increased women’s exposure to gender-based violence and reduced their access to essential services.

Aleppo, a key strategic city and the site of the most intense battles, remains among the most devastated areas. Even before the war, Aleppo had conservative and challenging social environments for women. Today, with destroyed infrastructure, unstable security, displacement, and multiple controlling factions—including those backed by Turkey—women experience compounded economic and social pressures.

 

Key Documented Violations and Restrictions

Movement, education, and employment restrictions are among the most documented violations. Extremist groups controlling different areas of Syria imposed strict limits on women’s movement, school attendance, work opportunities, and clothing—directly affecting their right to learn and work. A report by AVSI, an organization operating in Syria, noted a drop in women’s labor-force participation from around 22% to 13% nationally.

Thousands of women and girls outside Northeast Syria face major obstacles accessing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) services due to shortages of female staff and lack of access mechanisms. Local organizations express deep concern about killings, early marriage, and rape being used under the pretext of honor or community security.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, from HTS’s takeover on December 8, 2024 to October 8, 2025, criminal and targeted killings continued across Syrian cities—except those in Northeast Syria. During this period, 315 crimes were documented, leading to 359 deaths, including 50 women.

The past year showed a wide continuation of grave human-rights violations in Syria, including extrajudicial killings, field executions, kidnapping, torture, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, armed assaults, and repeated bombings.

The Syrian Observatory documented 10,955 deaths across the country during the reporting period, including 8,422 civilians—among them 463 children and 636 women—and 3,054 field executions.

According to a March 2025 report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 19 incidents of targeting or intimidation of female activists—including human-rights defenders and members of civil society organizations—were recorded between March 2024 and March 2025.

 

Complex Humanitarian and Social Conditions

The collapsing economy, destroyed infrastructure, and shutdown of schools and health centers mean that women bear double burdens in family care and livelihood support. According to UNICEF, more than 7,000 schools were damaged in the war, leaving 2.5–3 million children out of school—fueling child labor and early marriage.

Thousands of displaced people still live in camps, with women the most affected by harsh conditions. Camps offer limited healthcare and lack security, trapping women in cycles of vulnerability and violence. This situation is especially stark in rural Aleppo and surrounding areas. Violence, rape, and forced abductions by Turkey-backed militias have pushed women to the brink of death. In most HTS-controlled areas, no functioning legal or judicial system exists, making the idea of a state largely unrealistic.

 

As-Suwayda and Deferred Freedom

Before HTS forces stormed As-Suwayda, the city experienced fewer restrictions on women compared to Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa. This allowed women to maintain relatively active community roles. As-Suwayda stood as an example of relative female freedom compared with other Syrian cities. Yet, social and cultural constraints still forced many women to take precautionary measures when traveling to Damascus or HTS-controlled areas—such as wearing a head covering to avoid harassment.

However, following the July 13, 2025 attack, HTS fighters engaged in retaliatory acts against women in As-Suwayda. Cases of kidnapping, murder, and rape were reported, and women fleeing their villages faced severe violations of their dignity and autonomy. Surveillance and movement restrictions threatened their physical and psychological safety.

The Jihadists’ policies were even harsher in Alawite, Kurdish, and Druze regions. Druze women received treatment similar to Yazidi women. Dozens were kidnapped and raped, and mercenaries traded them in markets they established. The violence that engulfed As-Suwayda spread throughout the region. Workers in hospitals, schools, and public facilities—both men and women—were brutally killed.

After HTS made violence a defining feature of As-Suwayda, it continues its repressive practices today. This organization, which turned a large part of Syria into an unbearable hell for women, has become the most women-targeting force in a context where violence has been normalized. The massacres and rapes in As-Suwayda, along with the war, put immense pressure on families, leading to rising violence against women. Druze women were pushed into the heart of the violence under the brutal attacks of jihadist groups seeking to establish a so-called state. This picture clearly reflects the reality on the ground.

In summary, before the invasion, As-Suwayda enjoyed a more open social environment for women compared with other cities. However, the attack and resulting population displacement caused drastic changes in women’s living conditions. This period—marked by severe physical and psychological violence—shows how mercenary-driven repression aimed at political gain can weaken society as a whole.

 

Women’s Movements Confronting Violence

During the past year (2024–2025), there has been an increase in the activity of feminist and civil organizations focusing on combating domestic violence and child marriage despite extremely difficult political and economic circumstances. With different forces controlling the country geographically, women’s situations vary drastically from region to region. Some regions demonstrate advanced models of women’s empowerment, while others regress into traditional patterns that restrict women’s presence in public life.

First — The Feminist Movement in Northeast Syria

In Northeast Syria, a contrasting model emerged. The Autonomous Administration adopted a co-presidency system between women and men in political and civil institutions—a qualitative milestone in Syrian feminist history. This development empowered women in leadership positions and strengthened the principle of equal decision-making.

Women’s organizations in these areas—such as Kongra Star and Zenobia Women’s Community—played vital roles in raising awareness and empowering women socially and economically despite political and security challenges.

Second — The Experience of Women in As-Suwayda

In As-Suwayda, women took to the streets expressing long-standing suffering under the previous regime. They demanded rights and a civil system ensuring equality and freedom. Their optimism was short-lived. After the regime’s collapse, HTS attempted to impose restrictions and push women back into domestic roles.

However, women in As-Suwayda strongly resisted this model. They rebelled against imposed constraints using virtual platforms to voice opposition to patriarchal guardianship, asserting that any revolution excluding women is inherently flawed. Although the city was not fully under HTS control, the conservative discourse the group tried to promote faced notable resistance among women.

Third — Economic Crisis Forcing Women into the Labor Market

The severe economic crisis pushed Syrian women across regions to seek work to support their families. Women launched initiatives in agriculture, teaching, handicrafts, and local services. However, many working women faced harsh conditions: low wages, long working hours, and exploitation in environments lacking legal protections.

Fourth — Setbacks and Structural Barriers

Under HTS, women in Syria faced repeated setbacks. The worsening economy made women’s work a necessity, not a choice. At the same time, legal gaps and the collapse of state structures left women with no recourse when their rights were violated.

Temporary laws allowed husbands to restrict women’s employment. Personal-status laws based on Sharia deprived women of numerous rights. Sectarianism and religious identity also affected women’s rights, depending on the region and its dominant group.

In HTS-controlled territories, women have virtually no access to decision-making bodies and are subjected to strict political and social surveillance. In contrast, despite broad participation in Northeast Syria, the experience remains geographically confined.

Fifth — Conclusion

The Syrian feminist experience of the past year reflects a combination of achievements and setbacks. While women’s awareness and public engagement have grown, they unanimously reject any cooperation with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, whose rule escalated violence against women to the point of systematic killings.

Without democratic transformation guaranteeing women’s rights, there can be no democratic Syria, nor true women’s rights.

The feminist experience in Northeast Syria is advanced in terms of participation and representation, yet it remains geographically limited and inaccessible to most Syrian women. Building a fair and sustainable feminist system in future Syria requires separating laws from sectarian and religious references, institutionalizing legal and political equality, and applying this across all Syrian regions to form the basis of democratic transformation