Shilan Saqzi

News Center — After examining the history of the Yazidis in Shingal and their transformation from a marginalized group into a politically self-aware community, the second part shifts focus to the Yazidis of the Caucasus, particularly in Armenia. Here, research reveals how historical, cultural, and political complexities shaped a distinct path, where the redefinition of identity, state policies, and shared experiences played central roles. The memory of victimization and the struggle for survival helped form dualities of identity and politics among Kurdish Yazidis. The presence and role of Caucasian Kurds across three historical periods—pre-socialist, Soviet, and post-Soviet—reflect deeply intertwined political, cultural, and demographic Dynamics.

Caucasian Kurds… From Autonomy to Political Marginalization

1- From the Pre-Socialist Era to 1920

Kurds have long inhabited the border regions between Eastern Anatolia, the South Caucasus, and northern Mesopotamia. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, due to insecurity, forced migration, and economic and military pressures, many were relocated to the South Caucasus by the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. This led to the formation of Kurdish villages in Lachin, Zangezur, Karabakh, Nakhchivan, and parts of eastern Armenia.

Yazidis, who are part of the broader Kurdish community, also migrated to the Caucasus as a result of Ottoman religious persecution. Under the Russian Empire, Kurdish identity remained confined to tribe, religion, and language, without independent political institutions. Nevertheless, local leaders—khans, tribal chiefs, and sheikhs—played semi-autonomous roles in the absence of a nation-state, forming self-organizing structures that ensured community survival.

The Yazidi community received limited support from Tsarist Russia, as they were classified as a “non-Muslim community” and used to serve Russian interests against Ottoman influence. However, they had no organized political role during this period, as no Kurdish-language educational or media institutions existed in the South Caucasus. Kurdish was confined to oral traditions—stories, religion, and poetry. Low literacy levels, the absence of a standardized writing system, and the lack of cultural institutions further weakened collective Kurdish consciousness, despite some limited cultural activities and informal Kurdish lessons held in Yerevan and Tbilisi between 1918 and 1919.

The pre-socialist era for the Caucasian Kurds was marked by political marginalization, Tsarist colonial practices, and demographic engineering that fragmented the community and excluded it from power structures. Tsarist Russia did not recognize Kurdish identity, and Kurds, due to their tribal, religious, and linguistic structure, were unable to form a unified political entity. However, the migration of some educated Kurds to Baku and Tbilisi, and their contact with socialists and Bolsheviks, laid the foundation for a new Kurdish elite.

This elite would later play a significant role in the Soviet era through support for communism, the establishment of the “Red Star Republic,” and the creation of Kurdish-language newspapers. These elites emerged primarily from the cultural interaction in the cities of the Caucasus rather than as a direct continuation of traditional Kurdish society. Among the most prominent figures was Arab Shamo, the first Kurdish novelist in the Soviet Union

2-The Soviet Era, 1920–1991

With the collapse of the Russian Empire and the rise of Bolshevik rule, the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus changed, ushering the Kurds into a new phase of “cultural citizenship” within Soviet policies. In the 1920s, the “Korenizatsiya” (indigenization) policy provided an unprecedented opportunity for the Kurds of Armenia to express their identity after marginalization under the Tsarist regime. Dozens of Kurdish schools were established, newspapers such as Riya Kurd and Riya Taza were published, and the Yerevan Kurdish Radio played a central role in promoting Kurdish literature and language. The Kurdish Writers’ Union was founded in 1932 under the support of the Communist Party, the first state Kurdish theater opened in Alagyaz, and the first Kurdish novel was published in 1935, marking a historic step in written Kurdish literature.

Prominent figures such as Roman Amoyan, Amin Oudal, Arab Shamlov, Farik Boladbekov, Irem Silian, and Jalil Jalil contributed to creating the Cyrillic Kurdish alphabet. However, this cultural flourishing came to a halt in 1937 with Stalinist purges, during which hundreds of Kurds were deported from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Central Asia, and cultural activities were shut down. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Khrushchev era allowed a limited revival of Kurdish activities, yet it never reached the level of organization and enthusiasm seen in the 1930s.

Thus, this period was characterized by a complex duality: it offered unprecedented opportunities for education, publishing, and media, while simultaneously enforcing systematic repression and elite deportations. The Korenizatsiya policy, though seemingly supportive of minorities, was ultimately a tool for cultural control and Russian dominance through language, education, and media, making the temporary flourishing of Kurdish culture more a reflection of hidden agendas than a sustainable achievement.

 

3- Post-Soviet Era, 1991–2025

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not merely end a global system but marked the beginning of instability in newly independent republics like Armenia. For Kurds, it meant the collapse of the Soviet patronage system and the end of indigenization policies, leaving them in a marginalized and unstable position amid the formation of new nation-states. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, with rising ethnic tensions and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, many Kurds migrated from Armenia to Russia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia under social, political, and security pressures. Meanwhile, a significant segment of the Yazidis remained in Armenia due to their cultural and religious ties, participating in the conflict alongside Armenian forces.

Today, the remaining Kurds in Armenia mainly live in the Aragatsotn province in western Armenia, around the villages of Armavir, Ararat, Talin, Aparan, and Kotayk, as well as in Yerevan and the Algy mountainous region. Unlike the Soviet era, marked by population density and institutional organization, they now face dispersion, weak cohesion, and the absence of a clear cultural policy.

Kurds participate in Yerevan through associations and public organizations such as the Kurdish People’s Council, Kurdistan 1990 Committee, Council of Intellectuals, Armenian-Kurdish Friendship Council, and the Yazidi National Union, in addition to the Free Kurdish Women’s Movement. Riya Taza newspaper and Zagros magazine are published, Chira TV broadcasts religious and cultural programs, and Kurdish studies are taught at Yerevan University. Despite these activities, Kurds remain systematically marginalized in Armenia, where nationalist policies, structural constraints, emigration, and Yazidi integration into Armenian society have produced a reality closer to cultural subordination than coexistence. These cultural symbols serve only as symbolic consolation for the lack of institutional cohesion and the rebuilding of Kurdish identity.

 

Shingal and Yerevan: Cradles of Yazidi Identity

Since the 1990s, with Armenia adopting a new constitution, parliamentary quotas were established for minorities, including two seats for Yazidi Kurds, designated as a “religious and cultural Yazidi minority.” This separation in representation reflects an identity policy aimed at managing minorities and weakening the Kurdish voice. Yazidi elites and weak Kurdish organization contributed to this, institutionalizing a division accepted by both the state and the Yazidi community.

Seeking political adjustments and ethnic recognition, the Armenian government recognized the Yazidis as a distinct group separate from Kurds, leveraging this separation to strengthen control. Many Yazidi leaders themselves identify as an independent group for historical, cultural, and religious reasons and seek to assert this distinction in parliament, media, and education. This mirrors tendencies among some Yazidis in Shingal before the ISIS attack and parts of the Yarsan community in Eastern Kurdistan, who prioritize religious identity over Kurdish nationality.

Thus, the legal separation of Kurds and Yazidis in Armenia does not reflect recognition of Kurdish identity but rather reinforces an institutional divide that redefines it in a controlled and non-political manner. As a result, the Kurdish voice in the public sphere declined, presenting Kurds as a silent cultural-religious minority rather than a political actor.

 

Common Origins, Divergent Paths

The question of some Yazidis defining themselves as separate from Kurds, or preferring religious over Kurdish national identity, is complex, shaped by history, politics, and modern media representations. Historically, Yazidis were part of the Kurdish community, as reflected in Ottoman and Safavid sources. A series of massacres—from the Ottoman era to extremist groups—reinforced their sense of exclusion. In Yazidi collective memory, these massacres are recorded as “farmans,” the most notable being Farman 74 issued by ISIS in 2014.

After Farman 2014, some Yazidi forces in Shingal and Armenia redefined Yazidi identity as independent from Kurdish identity, often in opposition to Kurdish parties, particularly the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, stemming from feelings of betrayal or neglect during critical moments, such as the Peshmerga withdrawal from Shingal during the ISIS attack.

Following independence, Armenia, like other post-Soviet states, built the state on the basis of Armenian Christian Orthodox nationalism. In this context, minorities were treated according to religious and cultural rights rather than ethnic ones. Recognition of Yazidis as a “religious and cultural minority” rather than part of the Kurdish nation led to the construction of Yazidi temples near Yerevan, religious TV programming, and the establishment of a national day for Yazidis. However, no independent mechanism was created for Kurdish political representation.

Yazidi elites in Armenia emphasized cultural and religious identity over Kurdish nationalism, wary of links to Kurdish movements across all parts of Kurdistan, which could provoke sensitivity from the Armenian government. Consequently, both state policies and Yazidi choices reinforced the separation of Yazidis from Kurds and marginalized nationalist Kurdish demands.

In Syria and Iraq, the distinction between Yazidis and Kurds has been used to undermine Kurdish autonomy projects, and some Arab, Turkish, and Persian media promoted this separation to divide the Kurdish movement. Kurdish media, by ignoring Yazidi specificity and generalizing Kurdish identity, also contributed to misunderstandings. However, claiming that all Yazidis are separate from Kurds is an exaggeration stemming from biased media coverage by governments in various parts of Kurdistan.

Despite differences between the Yazidi communities in Armenia and Shingal in geography and politics, both share narratives of victimization, identity policies, and internal conflicts. Shared memory of massacres such as Farman 74 and the 2014 ISIS attack reinforced identity cohesion. In Shingal, some Yazidis sought independent self-rule, while in Armenia, Yazidi leaders emphasized their distinctiveness through government support and by benefiting from reserved parliamentary quotas.

In both communities, dualities such as Yazidi/Kurd, religious/nationalist, conservative/leftist generated internal divisions. In Armenia, Kurdish intellectuals see the separation between Yazidis and Kurds as an artificial political step and call for a shared Kurdish quota, while the government treats minorities as cultural-religious groups rather than national ones. Some Yazidis, meanwhile, emphasize the distinction between identity and religion, making their separate quota a natural outcome of this duality.